What’s next for US-China trade negotiations?
〝I think we can have a relationship where we still get along pretty well with China and really depend on each other a great deal economically, but it’s going to be a more contentious relationship.〞
Made in China 2025—— will it work?
〝It’s very expansionary in nature. It’s an intent to create a, I think, British imperialist sort of system where the rest of the world is a resource colony for the Chinese manufacturing base.〞
Kim Jong Un met Xi Jinping again—— why?
〝But I think the Chinese economic pressure is the main reason why he’s shown more interest in diplomacy.〞
Welcome to《 Zooming In》. I’m Simone Gao. The first round of trade negotiations between the U.S. and China weren’t overly successful. Many of the U.S. demands hit straight at the core of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s strategy for Made in China 2025. Can two countries with fundamentally different ideologies come to a trade compromise? How do China’s subsidies compare with those in the rest of the world? And how will recent events with Iran and North Korea affect the second round of trade negotiations between the U.S. and China? We’ll discuss these questions and more in this episode of 《Zooming In》.
Trade representatives from the U.S. and China met for the first round of trade talks. Afterwards, the American negotiating team went straight to the airport without releasing a statement, signaling it wasn’t a success.
根据《纽约时报》 5 月4 日的一篇文章，美国人提出了几项要求：
According to a May 4th article in the New York Times, the U.S. made several demands, including:
Cutting China’s trade surplus by $200 billion dollars by the end of 2020
＊停止“中国制造2025计划”中对所有先进制造业的补贴。 Halting all advanced manufacturing subsidies in its “Made in China 2025” program
Strengthening protection against intellectual property theft
Cutting its tariffs to 3.5% on all non-critical sectors, the same rate as the U.S.
And opening its agricultural sectors and services to full U.S. competition
The U.S. seeks fair trade and competition with China, especially in the technology sector.But China is unlikely to make concessions in this area because it is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s core strategy for advancing China’s competitive advantage.
萧茗（Host/Simone Gao）：贸易战谈判的焦点是〝中国制造2025〞计划。习近平希望籍此将中国大陆提升为高科技行业的领头羊，而不仅仅是世界工厂。回顾历史，美国不也是在英国退出世界舞台的中心之后，才成为世界霸主的吗？为何中共的产业提升计划让人恐惧？请听听我与南加州大学商学院助理教授Greg Autry博士的讨论。他还是《致命中国》的作者之一。
At the core of the trade war negotiation is Made in China 2025. It's a program that Xi Jinping put in place to structurally convert China from being the world factory to the world leader in high tech industries. Didn't the U.S. gain its world dominance after the UK yielded its position as the center of the world stage? What is the fear this time around? Let’s hear my discussion with Assistant Professor of Clinical Entrepreneurship from University of Southern California and co-author of Death by China, Dr. Greg Autry.
〝Some say, Made in China 2025 doesn't only seem to be a plan to grow the Chinese economy or making structural changes. It is expansionary in nature. Do you agree?〞
Greg Autry（南加州大学商学院助理教授）：〝绝对同意，它在本质上是非常扩张型的。它的意图是制造一个大英帝国式的系统，让全世界都成为中国大陆制造基地的资源殖民地， 让中国人的财富和中共的地缘政治力量都增强。其它国家只生产大豆之类的工业原料，销往中国大陆，但是不许生产制成品或是高科技材料，那些是中共政府要独占的领域。我认为这应该让所有人警觉。〞
〝Oh, absolutely. It’s very expansionary in nature. It’s an intent to create a, I think, British imperialist sort of system where the rest of the world is a resource colony for the Chinese manufacturing base and that the wealth of the Chinese people and the geopolitical power of the Chinese government accelerates. Other countries will produce things like soy beans and send them to China, but not be allowed to produce things like manufactured goods or high-tech materials which will be the sole province of the Chinese government. And that, I think, should worry us all. 〞
〝Since joining the WTO in 2001, what has China’s trade strategy been?〞
〝I think their fundamental strategy has been to target one strategic industry after another. And they’ve been very clear. Often these are explicitly called out in their five-year plans. And they go after that industry by subsidizing the manufacturing, very often with state-owned enterprises funded by state-owned banks. Then they lure in a great deal of Western capital to help them execute on that plan with promises of high returns. And they use that to produce massive overcapacity in that particular field, whether that’s steel or solar modules. This drives the price of the global commodity down to the point that American, European, Japanese companies can no longer afford to reinvest in their manufacturing facilities and keep themselves current and they lose their competitive advantage. This has worked brilliantly for the Chinese. So they end up capturing a monopoly stand in that category, and then they can begin to raise prices in order to bring the profits back to China while their competitors are out of the market.〞
〝Why is this unfair?〞
Greg Autry（南加州大学商学院助理教授）：〝我不知道公平与否是不是重要，失去这些产业当然不符合西方国家的利益。中共拥有如此多的经济力量也不符合人类的利益，因为那些钱支撑他们的政治和军事力量， 这都是中共的邻居立即面临的问题，长远看也是世界的问题。所以我关心这种行为的长期后果多于关心公平。 还有中国公司，尤其是国有企业，关注在降低成本提高产量上，不关心低层研发和发展，这将损害给人们带来长期福利的发明者，例如加州矽谷之类的地方。〞
〝I don’t know if it makes a difference whether it’s unfair or not. It’s certainly not in the interest of the Western countries to lose these industries. I believe it’s not in the interest of the global human race for the Chinese Communist Party to hold that much economic power because that supports their political and military power, which is certainly a problem for China’s neighbors immediately and, I believe, for the rest of the world going forward. So I don’t really worry about issues of fairness as much as I worry about what are the actual long-term outcomes of this. Plus, again, China’s companies, particularly state-owned enterprises, focus on driving the manufacturing costs down and the volumes up, and they don’t focus on fundamental innovation and development. And this is the sort of thing that will undermine the long-term benefits to everybody on Earth that come from the amazing innovation that happens in places like California, Silicon Valley.〞
萧茗（Host/Simone Gao）：〝自由市场，自由贸易和公平竞争是人类自由和尊严的体现。但是中共政权有不同的价值观。如果这是美中贸易冲突和其它冲突的根本原因，那么政策的修改或是政策层面的改善， 真的会解决这些问题吗？〞
〝This idea of free market, free trade, and fair competition is a manifestation of human freedom and dignity; however, the Chinese communist regime does not hold the same values. So if these are the driving forces behind the U.S.-China trade conflict and many other conflicts, can policy amendments or changes on the policy level really solve all these problems?〞
Greg Autry（南加州大学商学院助理教授）：〝我不知道这些办法能不能解决问题，但是我们别无他法，只能做政策改变，试着强势保护我们在技术和工业领域的投资。我们要确保技术不会随便就出口。更遭的是，随着美国在外的投资而被利用，变成意识形态与自己相反的国家的竞争工具，很讽刺的共产党已经学会了资本主义的工具，共产党宣言的一开始，马克思就明白企业家们创造财富和资本的力量，从而推动国家的发展。我认为中共很明白，在他们计划的第一步利用资本作为工具的重要性。但是长远来看，我不认为他们会一直采用这些想法， 他们只是利用这些手段建立力量基础，好在这基础之上实现他们别的目标，我认为这很恐怖。〞
〝I don’t know whether they can solve those problems, but we have no choice but to take policy changes and try to aggressively protect the investments that we’ve made in technologies and industries that produce jobs and wealth for Americans and ensure that those technologies are not simply transported and, even worse, capitalized with American capital investment to become competing institutions in a country whose ideology is opposed to the things that made all that possible. It’s ironic that the communist party has learned to use this tool of bourgeois capitalism. If you read the Communist Manifesto, Marx is very clear at the beginning about the power of the entrepreneurial class to create wealth and capital for a nation to go forward. And I think that the Chinese are very clear about the importance of leveraging that as a tool in the first step of their agenda. But in the long run, I don’t think they’re committed to these ideals. And they simply are using them to get to the power base that they need to execute on what they want to do after that, which, in my mind, is pretty horrific.〞
Coming up: Made in China 2025—— will it work?
According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, 〝Made in China 2025〞 is a program to 〝comprehensively upgrade Chinese industry〞. Its goal is to raise China’s domestic production of core components to 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025.
The Chinese regime relies on financial subsidies to keep costs down and compete in domestic and international markets. According to China commentator Wen Zhao, the regime uses public financial resources and taxpayers’ money to subsidize individual companies and industries. So it’s not the product that’s competitive, but the institution behind it.
One example of this is BOE Technology Group Co., which produces liquid crystal panels in China. The company received government subsidies for scientific research and products. In 2017 it borrowed an export tax rebate and increased its profit by 6 billion yuan.
This gave BOE an advantage in domestic and international markets, and impacted the industry in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
NARRATION: While the Chinese government encourages its own companies to compete internationally, it restricts foreign companies from setting up factories in China to compete in the Chinese market. A typical example is the car industry.
Some say the rise of South Korean science and technology is also a nationwide system, but the difference is that South Korea and other countries have policies for certain industries, not over all sectors.
This nationwide system is unique to China because it can intervene in society in ways that other countries can’t.
Other countries have private banks and independent regulatory authorities that won’t take unnecessary risks. But China can tell its state-controlled banks to provide loans that private banks wouldn’t.
The Chinese government also directly invests in scientific research. Although other countries do this as well, China’s scale is much larger.
萧茗（Host/Simone Gao）：西方一直在与〝大到不能倒闭〞的现象斗争。当一些企业，尤其是金融企业太大，彼此间联系太多的时候，他们的失败对整个经济体系造成灾难性的影响，这时候政府必须介入去帮助他们，每个国家的政府或多或少都会做这样的事情，区别是西方把政府救助作为一个保险，而中共政权把政府帮助当作他们的竞争优势。这个冲突以后会如何演变，让我们听听我和布鲁金斯研究所高级研究员Michael O’Hanlon的讨论。
The West has long struggled with the〝too big to fail〞phenomenon. When certain corporations, particularly financial institutions, are so large and so interconnected that their failure would be disastrous to the greater economic system, they must be supported by government when they face potential failure. Every country does this to a certain extend, the difference is, the west uses the government as a safe net, but the Chinese Communist regime uses the government as a competitive advantage. How will this conflict unfold moving forward, let’s hear my discussion with Brookings Institute senior fellow, Michael O’Hanlon.
〝Among the US demands in the trade negotiation last week, there is ‘Halting all advanced manufacturing subsidies in its Made in China 2025 program’. China turned down that request because for Xi Jinping, this is at core of his strategy for China to gain competitive advantage over other developed countries in the next couple of decades. How do you foresee this conflict unfolding going forward?〞
Michael O’Hanlon（布鲁金斯研究所高级研究员）：〝从传统意义上讲，绝大多数自由市场经济体不认同直接补贴，因为他们不谋求不公平的竞争优势。但是对于成熟行业，比如航空业，情况就有所不同。技术已经有了，问题只是生产中优化成本。在这类问题上，我多少能理解中国大陆的立场，因为他们想在重要的技术领域发展。确实，这些关键技术不仅事关中国大陆的对外竞争力，而且对增进国民福祉也很重要。所以，我认为一些国家试图加速技术创新不是坏事。美国也有一些科研项目在基础研究的核心层面，是由政府部分资助的。甚至政府在一些项目中，资助更先进的技术演示和原型开发。因此，我认为完全可以讨论，中国大陆应该在哪些技术领域投资以及投资多少， 如果大陆公司在某些产品的市场开发中，得到中共政府在研发和销售上的补贴，从而使他们获得竞争优势，这就非常接近于违反世贸组织规则了。但是基础创新、基础技术、研究，那就是另外一回事了，美国应该认识到这点。我不是说这个事没有讨论的余地。我认为促进科技创新是合法的，而试图帮助具体产品低价倾销就不合法了，这两者有本质区别。〞
〝Well, of course, in the classic sense, most free market economies don’t believe in direct subsidization of industry because they don’t want to give unfair trade advantage. But I think that’s a better argument when you’re talking about established sectors like aerospace. And we already have the technology, it’s just a question of producing it at an optimal cost. On this kind of an issue, I have some sympathy for the Chinese position because they’re trying to push forward on important areas of technology, and, yes, those are important for China’s competitive position vis-à-vis other countries, but they’re also important for the wellbeing of humanity. And I don’t think it’s a bad thing for countries to be trying to spur along a certain amount of technological innovation. We certainly have various kinds of scientific research efforts in the United States that are partially supported by the federal government at a core level of basic research, or even in some cases, more advanced technology demonstration and prototyping. Therefore, I think it’s a legitimate question about how much China and where China should invest in areas like artificial intelligence. If it starts trying to give competitive advantage to its own firms as they try to market certain products and then subsidizes the development and sale of those products, that becomes closer to a trade violation according to the normal rules of the WTO. But for basic innovation, basic technology, research, I think that that’s a whole different category of discussion. And the United States needs to recognize that. I’m not suggesting this is a slam dunk case that should not be discussed at all. But there is a major distinction between trying to promote technology innovation on the one hand, which I think is generally legitimate, and then trying to help specific products be sold at perhaps a lower than their proper production cost, which is not legitimate.〞
萧茗（Host/Simone Gao）： 我认为更准确的描述是中国政府承包了一切。中国政府补贴技术创新，同时也帮助中国产品以较低的价格出售，最重要的是他们直接参与利益政府资助的行动来窃取外国技术，我与O’Hanlon先生讨论了美国对中国态度的变化，让我们来听一听。
I think a more accurate description is the Chinese government actually does it all. Yes, they subsidy the technology innovation, but they also help Chinese products to be sold at a lower price. On top of that, they are directly involved in using government funded operations to steal foreign technology. The following discussion I had with Mr. O’hanlen addresses the change in the U.S. attitude towards China. Let’s take a listen.
〝Over the past decades, the Chinese economy thrived on relying on Western investment and technology sharing. In exchange, the West was eyeing the enormous Chinese consumer market. At what point was this understanding disrupted? What were the driving factors?〞
Michael O’Hanlon（布鲁金斯研究所高级研究员）：〝好问题。我认为有很多原因。不只是因为川普总统的因素，更重要的是美国举国上下，如何看待中国作为一个经济伙伴。确实在邓小平上台后很多年里，美国和其它西方国家想和中国大陆在经济上往来，暂时容忍了中共盗窃知识产权，以及通过各种方式破坏国际贸易规则 。 一部分希望是更繁荣的中国最终会在经济和安全上成为外部世界的伙伴，更富裕的中国也会部分自由化。然后就像你所说，美国和很多西方国家的公司想要进入中国市场，所以这个原因也让我们合作。我们设想中国会建设一个更好的法律系统，更有利的投资环境，随着时间推移，这会继续改进。现在过去大概十年中，我们确实看见了一些重要改变，开始侵蚀这个框架，这个模型。首先，当然就是中国现在是潜在的军事威胁，我们在南中国海和中国东海看见明确的军事行动，还有每年2000亿美元的军费，这意味这中国在用财富对我们不利。第二，习近平已经把他自己的控制和共产党的强势合并，至少在中央政策的制定上是这样。所以这个更富裕的中国会更自由的想法已经证明是错的了。最后，还有这个越来越恶化的中共对美不公平贸易的问题。西方世界需要加强保护知识产权和市场准入。所以这么说来，我们不应该把川普看成美国政治的局外人。是的，我认为民主、共和两党会在一些领域联合起来对抗中共。我认为我们还是能和中国大陆维持良好的关系，在经济上也会高度互相依赖。但是未来双方关系中会出现更多摩擦，美国也会寻求保护自己的特定利益，力度将超过毛时代之后的任何时期。〞
〝That’s an excellent question. I think there are a lot of reasons why, not just because of President Trump, but more generally in the United States, the tide has shifted in how we think about China as an economic partner. It’s true that for many years after – especially after the assent of Deng Xiaoping – the United States and other Western countries tried to engage with China economically and tolerated even some intellectual property theft and other kinds of bending of the rules or breaking of the rules of international trade. And part of the hope here was that a more prosperous China would gradually become more of a partner with the outside world in economics and also in security and that China would liberalize partly as it became richer. And that was part of the gamble. And then as you say, also, the United States and many Western countries, their companies wanted to get into that Chinese consumer market, and so we wanted to cooperate for that reason as well. We assumed that China would build a better system of law and a more favorable investment climate and environment. And over time, this would continue to improve. Well, now there are – over the last 10 years or so, we’ve really seen a number of important developments that have begun to erode this framework, this paradigm. For one thing, of course, China’s now a potential military threat, and we see assertive behavior in places like the South China Sea and the East China Sea, along with a $200 billion a year military budget, which means that some of this wealth China is using for reasons that could be at our disadvantage. Second, Xi Jinping has consolidated his own control and the strength of the Communist Party, at least in terms of central policy making. So the idea that wealth or a wealthier China would become a freer China or a more democratic China has been proven to be wrong. And then finally, the last thing I would say is that, of course, now we also have unfair trade practices in China that are really not getting better as time goes by. And the Western world is going to have to protect its own intellectual property and its own market access a little more. So in this regard, we should not view Donald Trump as a particular outlier in terms of American politics. And, yes, I think that Democrats and Republicans will increasingly be united in trying to push back against China in certain areas. I think we can have a relationship where we still get along pretty well with China and really depend on each other a great deal economically, but it’s going to be a more contentious relationship. And the United States is going to seek out to protect certain prerogatives more than it has for most of the post-Mao era.〞
Coming up: How will recent events with North Korea and Iran affect US-China trade negotiations?
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping and other senior Chinese officials on May 7th and 8th. It was the second trip in the past two months, coming in advance of Kim’s talks with President Trump.
On May 8th, President Trump announced his withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal.
And Chinese Vice Premier Liu He will come to Washington for round two of trade talks.
Kim Jong Un surprised the world once again by meeting Xi Jinping on May 8th. That was the second visit in two months and right before the Trump-Kim meeting. Is China trying to leverage North Korea as a negotiation chip for its trade issues? What message is Trump sending by announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear deal? Here’s what our guests had to say.
〝What do Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping want to get out of their recent meeting?〞
Michael O’Hanlon（布鲁金斯研究所高级研究员）：〝很显然，北韩想缓解经济制裁，起因是2017年进行的核试验和导弹试射。同时中共现在有意在经济上对北韩施加前所未有的压力。 这是金正恩不得不通过外交途径来求和的最简单的原因。还有另外一些原因，就是他现在有了更精密的核武能力，也许是觉得自己有了谈判筹码了，他也可能是害怕川普总统的威胁。但我认为中共在经济上施压是北韩转向外交途径的主因，我认为金正恩正在向某些国家示好，他过去忽视它们，不理睬它们，甚至向它们挑衅。金正恩希望中共能减轻对北韩的经济压力，但不愿向美方作出全盘让步，特别是要北韩立即完全无核化的要求。他现在是想为即将到来的川-金会预设前提，因为他清楚川普总统是要求北韩立即无核化。我认为金正恩的想法是一厢情愿，他最想通过改善与中共和南韩的关系，在实现完全无核化之前，就解除某些经济制裁措施。我认为这是当前的主题，也是金正恩展开外交攻势的主要目的。中共要的是一个局势稳定的朝鲜半岛，他们想通过外交途径来达到这一目的。我当然希望中共能劝金正恩严肃对待美方要求，即使美方同意北韩可以分阶段弃核，整个过程也不能有丝毫含糊。北韩一开始就得有实质性举措，比如拆除近年来一直在制造核武的基础设施。这些课题可能就是促成最近的金-习会的原因。〞
〝Obviously, North Korea needs to lighten the economic pressure that it’s faced ever since its nuclear and missile tests of 2017. And the Chinese willingness to really put more pressure on North Korea economically than had ever been the case before. I think this is the simplest explanation for Kim Jong Un’s charm offensive. There are other explanations that contribute, perhaps, as well, such as the fact that now he has a more elaborate nuclear weapons capability and maybe he feels more confident in that capability. And he’s also perhaps afraid
a little bit of President Trump’s threats. But I think the Chinese economic pressure is the main reason why he’s shown more interest in diplomacy. So now I think he’s trying to establish good rapport with various countries that he had been neglecting or ignoring or been bellicose towards. And with China in particular, he obviously hopes that even without necessarily making all the concessions that Washington will demand, even without complete denuclearization in the immediate future, that there will still be a lessening of Chinese economic pressure. I think he’s trying to set the table for that kind of a deal with Washington because he understands that President Trump really wants complete denuclearization to happen very fast. I don’t think that’s realistic. And the most important thing for President Kim to do in his own calculous is to improve relations with South Korea and China to the point where he will get some economic relief even prior to any complete denuclearization. And so I think that’s probably much of the subject matter and also much of the overall purpose of these meetings. For the Chinese, you know, they want a stable situation on the Korean peninsula. They would like to see these talks be successful. I certainly hope they’re telling President Kim that Washington does mean business. And even if there could be a phased approach to denuclearization, it’s going to have to be a serious process. And it’s going to have to begin with some significant North Korean steps like dismantling the nuclear weapons production infrastructure that has led to a growing arsenal in recent years. So those are some of the messages and purposes that I expect led to the Kim-Xi summits in recent weeks.〞
〝 How will President Trump’s exit from the Iran deal affect his upcoming talks with Kim Jong-un?〞
〝Well, I would expect that North Korea would have two main observations about the Iran nuclear deal. One of them is that it’s for a problem a long ways away, a country a long ways away, a much different situation, especially because Iran has been aggressive throughout the broader Middle East and that’s something that threatens American interests and American allies in a way that North Korea, for all of its main big problems, does not threaten the United States the same way regionally. It is not actively stoking terrorism or violence in other countries the way that Iran is. So the first observation that I believe Kim would have is that Iran is a long ways away and a different problem. But the second observation would be that perhaps he could use Iran as a bit of bargaining leverage. And he can say to President Trump, do you really think I can give up my nuclear arsenal entirely and immediately in a situation where I have reason to doubt that a future American president would respect the deal that you’re now willing to make with me. And maybe even if you promise never to threaten military force against North Korea, maybe a future president would change his or her mind the same way that you, President Trump, changed the American position on the joint comprehensive plan of action with Iran. And, in other words, Kim would use that as a talking point and as a bargaining point of leverage in trying to point out to President Trump why complete and immediate denuclearization is really not realistic for North Korea. I hope that North Korea will completely denuclearize very fast. But I do not expect it. And I think Kim will be looking for ways to reduce the likelihood that he’ll be put under a lot of pressure to achieve that complete and immediate denuclearization.〞
〝 Will it affect US-China trade negotiations?〞
〝Well, you know, when I was in Beijing this week, we had numerous track two discussions with some very prominent Chinese scholars at various think tanks, and a number of them said to us, the American delegation from Brookings and other think tanks, they said that we don’t really think these issues need to be linked, but all of us also acknowledged – or many of us acknowledged – that sometimes these issues are linked because the way in which leaders get along, the basic atmospherics of their relationship can affect their ability to address a problem like North Korea. So even if we say that North Korea should be viewed on its own terms, it definitely tends to have some impact just what happens in other sectors like on issues of Taiwan, issues of trade, and so forth. So there’s a partial separation of the topics, but there will not be complete delinkage. I don’t think that’s realistic. 〞
萧茗（Host/Simone Gao）：〝Greg Autry是这样看的。〞
〝 Here’s what Greg Autry has to say about this topic。〞
〝 Kim Jong-Un visited China for the second time last week. What do Kim and Xi want respectively?〞
〝You know, I wish I could be a fly in that room and see what that conversation is about. In my personal opinion, the Chinese government has always used the North Korean government as a tool to off-put the United States geopolitically and militarily. Very often when the Chinese Communist Party needed a distraction from a tense US-China issue, they would, I believe, provoke one of the Kims to move forward and create a situation that required the United States to then go supplicate to Beijing and ask for assistance in managing the Kim regime. The latest king Kim of Korea is now stepping forward, apparently, with this bold move to make peace, both with the South and potentially with the U.S. It’s an interesting distraction, but again, these are not nations that believe in the rule of law, so I’m not sure what you get out of any agreement with them, as we’ve seen with North Korea before. No agreement that you make with that state is likely to be honored. So I will sit back and watch with great interest. As far as what Xi and Kim said, I suspect that Xi told Kim what to do. But who knows.〞
〝How will president Trump’s exit from the Iran deal affect his upcoming talks with Kim Jong-un? 〞
〝I think it underscores the fact that we’re suddenly dealing with a U.S. president who isn’t a lap dog to global perceptions of how geopolitics should be managed, but actually stands up for U.S. interests in a bold and straightforward way. The willingness to exit out of a badly conceived previous agreement I think makes it clear to Kim that he’s dealing with somebody who will act forcibly in US interests.〞
Host7 (conclusion): We’ve seen a lot of firsts with how the Trump administration handles geopolitics. The withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement and the upcoming talks with Kim Jong Un are a big contrast from previous administrations. And with the next round of trade talks between the U.S. and China, it remains to be seen whether or not a compromise can be made and if two opposing ideologies can come to an agreement. Thanks for watching 《Zooming In》 and see you next week.
Producer: Simone Gao
Writer: Michelle Wan Jess Beatty Simone Gao
Editors: Julian Kuo Bonnie Yu Frank Lin Bin Tang
Narration: Rich Crankshaw
Camera: Jimmy song
Transcription: Greg Yang Xiaofeng Zhang Guiru Zhang Frank Yuan
Special Effects：Harrison Sun
Assistant producer: Bin Tang Merry Jiang
Host accessories are sponsored by Yun Boutique
NTDTV 《Zooming In》
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